Referral programs have become a popular way to acquire customers. Yet, there is no evidence to date that customers acquired through such programs, referred customers for short, are more valuable than other customers. We address this gap and investigate to what extent referred customers are more profitable and more loyal. Tracking approximately 10,000 customers of a leading German bank for almost three years, we find that referred customers (i) have a higher contribution margin, though this difference erodes over time, (ii) have a higher retention rate, and this difference persists over time, and (iii) are more valuable both in the short and long run.
INTRODUCTION
Word of mouth (WOM) has re-emerged as an important marketing phenomenon, and its use as a customer acquisition method has started to attract renewed interest (e.g., Godes and Mayzlin 2009; Iyengar, Van den Bulte, and Valente 2010) . Traditionally, WOM's appeal has lied in the belief that it is cheaper than other acquisition methods. A few recent studies document that customers acquired through WOM also tend to churn less than customers acquired through traditional channels, and that they tend to bring in additional customers for the firm through their own WOM (Choi 2009; Trusov, Bucklin, and Pauwels 2009; Villanueva, Yoo, and Hanssens 2008) . One study further suggests that customers acquired through WOM may generate more revenue for the firm than customers acquired through traditional marketing efforts (Villanueva, Yoo, and Hanssens 2008) .
From a managerial point of view, these findings are encouraging and suggest purposely stimulating WOM to acquire more customers. However, there are concerns that WOM stimulated by the firm may be substantially less effective than organic WOM in generating valuable customers (Trusov, Bucklin, and Pauwels 2009; Van den Bulte 2010) : (i) targeted prospects may be suspicious of stimulated WOM efforts; (ii) such efforts often involve a monetary reward for the referrer who as a result may seem less trustworthy; (iii) programs providing economic benefits tend not to be very sustainable (Lewis 2006 ); (iv) unlike organic WOM, stimulated WOM is not free, raising questions about cost-effectiveness; and (v) stimulated WOM is prone to abuse by opportunistic referrers.
The uncertainty about the benefits of stimulated WOM in customer acquisition is frustrating for managers facing demands to increase their marketing ROI and wondering whether or not to use this method. Our study addresses this managerial issue by investigating the value of customers acquired through stimulated WOM and comparing it with the value of customers acquired through other methods. We do so in the context of a specific WOM marketing practice that is gaining prominence: referral programs in which the firm rewards existing customers for bringing in new customers. Whereas such programs are generally seen as an attractive way to acquire customers, their benefits are typically considered to be their targetability and cost effectiveness (Mummert 2000) . We broaden this view by assessing the value of customers acquired through such a program.
Specifically, we answer four questions. (i) Are customers acquired through a referral program more valuable than other customers? (ii) Is the difference in customer value large enough to cover the costs of such stimulated WOM customer acquisition efforts? (iii) Are customers acquired through a referral program more valuable because they generate higher margins, exhibit higher retention, or both? (iv) Do differences in margins and retention remain stable or do they erode? The answers to the last two questions provide a deeper insight into what might be driving the value differential.
We answer those four questions using panel data on all 5,181 customers that a leading German bank acquired through its referral program (referred customers) between January and December 2006 and a random sample of 4,633 customers the same bank acquired through other methods (non-referred customers) over the same period. For both groups of customers, we track profitability (measured as contribution margin) and loyalty (measured as retention) at the individual level from the date of acquisition until September 2008. The total observation period spans 33 months. We use two metrics of customer value: (i) the present value of the actually observed contribution margins realized within the data window, and (ii) the expected present value over a period of six years from the day of acquisition. Though our study is limited to a single research site as is common for studies requiring rich and confidential data, the methodology and findings are of wide interest. Customer referral programs are gaining popularity in many industries, including financial services, hotels, automobiles, newspapers and contact lenses (Ryu and Feick 2007) .
We make the following contributions: First, we provide the first empirical evidence that a referral program, a form of stimulated WOM, is an attractive way to acquire customers. Referred customers exhibit a higher contribution margin, retention, and customer value. Second, based on our finding that differences in contribution margin erode over time whereas those in retention do not, we document that referred customers are more valuable in both the short and long run.
Third, we show that the referral effect need not be present in every customer segment. Finally, we illustrate how the type of analysis we conduct allows firms to calculate the Return-onInvestment and the upper bound for the reward in their customer referral programs.
We proceed by offering a description of referral programs and developing our hypotheses. A description of the research setting, the data, and the model specifications follows.
Then, we report the results. Finally, we discuss implications for practice, limitations, and future research opportunities.
CUSTOMER REFERRAL PROGRAMS
Customer referral programs are a form of stimulated WOM that provide incentives to existing customers to bring in new customers. An important requirement for such programs is that individual purchase or service histories are available so the firm can ascertain if a referred customer is indeed a new rather than existing or former customer.
Referral programs have three distinctive characteristics. First, they are deliberately initiated, actively managed, and continuously controlled by the firm, which is impossible or very difficult with organic WOM activities like spontaneous customer conversations and blogs.
Second, the key idea is to use the social connections of existing customers with non-customers to convert the latter. Third, to make this conversion happen, the firm offers the existing customer a reward for bringing in new customers.
Whereas leveraging the social ties of customers with non-customers to acquire the latter is not unique to customer referral programs, their three distinctive characteristics set them apart from other forms of network-based marketing (Van den Bulte and Wuyts 2007). Unlike organic WOM, referral programs are actively managed and monitored by the firm. Unlike most forms of buzz and viral marketing, the source of social influence is limited to existing customers rather than anyone who knows about the brand or event. Unlike multi-level marketing, existing customers get rewarded only for bringing in new customers. They do not perform any other sales function (e.g., hosting parties) and do not generate any income as a function of subsequent sales.
Consequently, referral programs do not carry the stigma of exploiting social ties for mercantile purposes like multi-level marketing does (Biggart 1989) .
In most referral programs, the reward is given regardless of how long the new referred customers stay with the firm. Such programs are prone to abuse by customers. Though the firm does not commit to accept every referral, the incentive structure combined with imperfect screening by the firm creates the potential for abuse in which existing customers get rewarded for referring low-quality customers. This kind of moral hazard is less likely to occur with WOM campaigns that do not involve monetary rewards conditional on customer recruitment.
Existing studies of customer referral programs have provided guidance about when rewards should be offered (Biyalogorsky, Gerstner, and Libai 2001; Kornish and Li 2010) ; quantified the impact of rewards and tie strength on referral likelihood (Ryu and Feick 2007; Wirtz and Chew 2002) ; and quantified the monetary value of making a referral (Helm 2003; Leone 2007, 2010) . The key managerial question of the (differential) value of customers acquired through referral programs has not yet been addressed.
HYPOTHESES
Because referral programs are a customer acquisition method, an important metric to assess their effectiveness is the value of the customers they bring in. Additional insights come from investigating differences between referred and non-referred customers in contribution margins and retention rates, the two main components of customer value (e.g., Gupta and Zeithaml 2006; Wiesel, Skiera, and Villanueva 2008) .
Our hypotheses on these customer metrics of managerial interest are informed by prior work in economics and sociology on employee referral (e.g., Coverdill 1998; Rees 1966) , especially the work of Fernandez, Castilla, and Moore (2000) , Neckerman and Fernandez (2003), and Castilla (2005) on the quality of employee referral programs. Those studies show that the benefits of such programs are realized through distinct mechanisms, of which better matching and social enrichment appear particularly relevant to marketers. Better matching is the phenomenon that referrals fit with the firm better than non-referrals do, and social enrichment is the phenomenon that the relationship of the referral with the firm is enriched by the presence of a common third party, i.e., the referrer.
Customer referral programs are likely to be subject to similar mechanisms as employee referral programs because they share the three distinctive characteristics of having active management, using the social connections of existing contacts, and offering rewards with the risk of abuse. Better matching and social enrichment are especially likely to be at work in our research setting. Selecting a bank may substantially alter one's financial well being and is a highinvolvement decision, like choosing a job is. It also involves a fair amount of uncertainty.
Though some basic banking products like checking accounts are well known to most customers, the wider set of financial services provided by banks are considered experience goods rather than search goods (e.g., Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro 2007; Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry 1985) .
Recurrent losses by many private investors indicate that many people are not very skilled at assessing complex offerings of banks.
We use the better matching and social enrichment mechanisms only to develop and motivate our hypotheses. Our goal is to document managerially relevant differences in contribution margin, retention and customer value, rather than to test those specific mechanisms.
The mechanisms are only possible explanations for the differences we document.
Differences in Contribution Margin
Several characteristics of social dynamics in human networks (e.g., Van den Bulte and Wuyts 2007) imply that referred customers may match up with the firm better than other newly acquired customers. The first is reciprocity. Because referring customers receive a reward, norms of reciprocity may make non-opportunistic customers feel obliged to bring in new customers who they think may be valuable to the firm (Gouldner 1960) . This process explains the finding by Neckerman and Fernandez (2003) that referrals for which the referrer claimed a fee had lower turnover than referrals for which no fee was claimed. The second social dynamic likely to be at work is triadic balance. If the main function of the program is simply to nudge customers into making referrals without much consideration for the monetary reward (Thaler and Sunstein 2008) , then principles of triadic balance will make existing customers more likely to bring in others who they feel would match well with what the firm has to offer. A third social dynamic likely to be at work is homophily-the tendency for people to interact with people like them.
Whereas reciprocity and triadic balance imply that referrers are diligent and active in screening and matching peers to firms, homophily implies that customers are likely to refer others who are similar to themselves. Because existing customers have an above-average chance of being a good match (otherwise, they would not be customers), firms may benefit from referral programs through "passive" homophily-based matching rather than only deliberate "active" screeningbased matching by referrers (Kornish and Li 2010; Montgomery 1991; Rees 1966) .
Acquisition through referral can also result in informational advantages, making referred customers more profitable than other customers. Referred customers are likely to have discussed the firm's offerings with their referrer. As a result, they are likely to use its products more extensively than novice customers who take a more cautious approach in building involvement.
There also can be informational advantages to the firm if people refer others similar to themselves on dimensions that are relevant to the enjoyment of the product or service but that are not immediately observable to the firm (Kornish and Li 2010) . Examples for financial services include risk aversion and a sense of fiscal responsibility. In those situations, the firm can make inferences from the observed behavior of the referrers about which products the referred customers will be most interested in (e.g., Guseva 2008) . As a result, the firm is able to serve the referred customer in a tailored fashion very early on, something that takes time to learn for other newly acquired customers. Because of this informational advantage, the firm should be able to generate a higher contribution margin from referred customers at the beginning of the relationship.
However, the advantages of better matching and better information should gradually vanish. As non-referred customers accumulate experience with the firm, they should become equally well informed about the firm's offerings and procedures. Likewise, the firm should be able to use the purchase and service history of the non-referred customer to serve them better.
Furthermore, non-referred customers who are not a good match for the firm are more likely to leave. Consequently, both revenues and costs of referred and non-referred customer should converge, eliminating the difference in contribution margin over time. Hence we expect:
H1: (a) The average contribution margin of a customer acquired through a referral
program is higher than that of a customer acquired through other methods, but (b) this difference becomes smaller over time.
Differences in Retention
Social enrichment is another mechanism that may increase the value of referred customers. The argument is that the relationship with the firm is enriched by the fact that a family member or friend is a customer of the same firm (Castilla 2005; Fernandez, Castilla, and Moore 2000) . Having a person close to oneself in a similar position (i.e., being a customer of the same firm) should increase one's trust in the firm and strengthen the emotional bond with it, as both balance theory and social closure theory predict (Van den Bulte and Wuyts 2007) . This prediction is also consistent with findings that customers reflecting on their affect towards a firm mention friends who are customers with the same firm (Yim, Tse, and Chan 2008) . Such relations should be particularly relevant in a banking context, where emotions and trust play an important role in the customer-firm relationship (e.g., Edwards and Day 2005; Fleming, Coffman, and Harter 2005) . In short, referred customers are likely to feel a stronger sense of commitment and attachment to the firm. This implies that referred customers are less likely to churn than non-referred customers, provided that their referrer does not churn either. The latter condition is likely to hold: referrers typically have a higher long-term likelihood to stay, which is why intention to refer is frequently used as an indicator of loyalty (Gupta and Zeithaml 2006) .
Whereas the informational advantage of a referred customer decreases over time as direct experience substitutes for social learning, there is no reason to expect erosion in the affective bonding underlying the social enrichment mechanism. Consequently, the erosion of the differential expected in contribution margin need not apply to retention. Therefore, we state: 
Differences in Customer Value
If hypotheses H1 and H2 hold, and if the erosion of contribution margins does not outweigh the initial difference in margins and the persisting difference in retention, the following should hold as well:
H3: The average value of a customer acquired through a referral program is higher than that of a customer acquired through other methods.
H3 can hold even when H1 and H2 do not because it is possible for the differences in both margins and retention to be small but their combined effect to be sizable and significant. Another reason to test H3 on customer value, in addition to hypotheses H1 and H2 on margins and retention, is that customer value is what managers should care about most.
Even though we base our prediction on sound theoretical arguments, the posited effects are not as obvious as they may seem because there are several competing forces at work. First, the prospect of earning a referral fee may induce referrers to pressure their peers to become customers without giving much consideration to whether or not the firm actually matches their peers' needs. Second, the relationship between the referred customer and his referrer, necessary for social enrichment to operate, comes with an inherent risk: When referrers defect, the customers they brought in may become more likely to leave as well. Even though it seems unlikely that referrers as a whole are more churn-prone than the average customer, the risk of contagious defection must not be ignored altogether. Third, an abuse of the referral program by customers only interested in the monetary reward is probably the most important reason for skepticism in the mind of practitioners. This is illustrated by the termination of TiVo's referral program due to frequent abuses (ZatzNotFunny 2008).
Support for our hypotheses would allow one to conclude that the positive effects outweigh the negative ones. In addition, the empirical analysis provides not only a test of the hypotheses but also an estimate of the size of the customer value differential. Firms can use the latter to put a maximum value on the reward to be paid out as part of their referral program.
METHODS

Research Setting
We use data from a leading German bank whose name we do not divulge for confidentiality reasons. The data captures all customers acquired through the bank's referral program between January and December 2006 and a random sample of customers acquired through other methods (e.g., direct mail, advertising) over the same period. The latter group may include customers affected by organic WOM for which the bank did not pay any fee. To the extent that the value of customers acquired through organic WOM is equal to or greater than that of customers acquired through the referral program, our results underestimate the value differential between WOM and non-WOM customers. Regardless, we correctly estimate the value differential between customers acquired through the referral program and all other customers for which no referral fee was paid.
The observation period spans from January 2006 until September 2008 (33 months), and the data on each individual customer includes the day of acquisition, the day of leaving the bank (if applicable), the contribution margin in each year, and some demographics. In total, we have data on 5,181 referred and 4,633 non-referred customers. Because the referral program was only used in a business-to-consumer context, all customers are persons.
The referral program was communicated to existing customers through staff and flyers in the branches and through mailings.
1 The procedure was straightforward: Every existing customer who brought in a new customer received a reward of 25 Euros in the form of a voucher that could be used at several well-known German retailers. 2 Except for opening an account, the referred customer did not have to meet any prerequisites (e.g., minimum amount of assets, minimum stay) for the referrer to receive the reward.
The year 2006 was not unusual in terms of customer acquisition and the bank's management is confident that findings about customers acquired in 2006 are applicable to 1 These mailings went to the referring customers. Mailings to which the non-referred customers responded were sent directly to them. 2 Whereas confidentiality concerns preclude us from reporting the average cost of acquisition for referral and nonreferral customers, we can report that the total acquisition cost for referred customers (including not only the referral fee but also the additional administrative costs of record keeping, paying out, etc.) is on average about 20 Euros lower than that for non-referred customers acquired through mailings.
customers acquired in earlier or later years. Proprietary information of the bank shows that its customers are very similar to those of other leading European banks. As to the usage of its referral program and the response of its customers to it, no differences with other firms are apparent either.
Dependent Variables
Daily Contribution Margin is the individual contribution margin on a daily basis. It is the total contribution margin generated by the customer in the observation period, divided by the total number of days the customer was with the bank (Duration). This per diem scaling ensures the comparability of the contribution margin of customers with different observed (and possible censored) durations. The contribution margin equals revenue (interest and fees) minus direct costs (e.g., interest expenses, sales commissions, brokerage and trading costs). The acquisition costs are not subtracted from the contribution margin. We also compute a time-varying version of Daily Contribution Margin by dividing the contribution margin generated by the customer in a particular year (2006, 2007, 2008) by the number of days the customer was with the bank in that year.
Duration is the total number of days the customer was observed to be with the bank. It is the basis for analyzing retention.
We calculate two measures of customer value, one based only on observed data, and the other based on both observed data and predictions. Observed Customer Value is the present value of all actual contribution margins the customer generated during the whole observation period (e.g., 33 months for retained customers acquired in January 2006). This metric is affected by both contribution margin and retention because a customer generates no margins after leaving the bank. 
where OM is is the observed monthly contribution margin of customer i in the sth month after acquisition (calculated from the observed annual contribution margin and the observed duration), Dur i is the customer's observed lifetime with the bank in months, δ i is a dummy censoring variable indicating whether the customer was still with the bank by the end of the observation period, PM is is the predicted monthly contribution margin of customer i in the sth month after acquisition, PA is is the predicted probability that the customer i is still "alive" (i.e., with the bank)
in that month, and r is the firm-specific annual discount rate of 11.5%. 4 . The present value reflects what the customer is worth at the day of acquisition.
Independent Variables
The independent variable of central interest is Referral Program, a binary indicator taking the value 1 for referred customers, i.e., those customers that were acquired through the referral program, and 0 for non-referred customers.
To improve the comparability of referred and non-referred customers we control for the demographic variables Age, Female (dummy variable with female coded 1, male coded 0) and Marital Status (dummy variables for married, divorced/separated, single, and widowed, with no answer as the base category). We also control for the customer's Month of Acquisition (11 dummy variables for each month with December 2006 as the base category).
To assess the robustness of the difference in customer value, we also conduct separate analyses for the two key segments of the bank: retail customers with standard financial needs and non-retail customers with significant assets or requiring more sophisticated financial advice. This segmentation scheme used by the bank is based on a comprehensive analysis of both financial data (e.g., assets invested with the bank, monthly checking account balance) and demographic information (e.g., profession, place of residence). The segments form the basis for all strategic customer-related decisions of the bank.
Descriptive Statistics
The sample includes several customers with an extremely high Daily Contribution
Margin that is up to 80 standard deviations above the mean and median. Such extreme data points can influence comparisons of means and regression results, so we purify the data using the standard DFBETA and DFFIT criteria to identify influence points (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch, 1980) . This procedure led to the deletion of 172 referred customers (3.3% of the original 5,181 referred customers) and 147 non-referred customers (3.2% of the original 4,633 non-referred customers). As reported in the sub-section "Robustness Checks", testing the hypotheses without deleting the influence points results in larger differences and provides stronger support for the
hypotheses. Yet, we believe the size estimates obtained without the influence points are more informative. Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and the correlation matrix for the purified sample of 9,495 customers. As indicated by the non-zero correlations between the Referral Program variable and the various demographic and time of acquisition variables, the groups of referred and non-referred customers are not perfectly matched on demographics and time of acquisition. Hence, it is desirable to control for these differences.
[Insert Table 1 Referred customers tend to generate higher margins, and the margins tend to erode more quickly among referred customers, such that the margin differential is narrower in 2008 than in 2006 (8 vs. 18 cents/day). Similarly, Figure 2 shows that, after approximately a year, the retention rate of referred customers is higher, and that it is so regardless of duration. Controlling for differences in demographics and time of acquisition is necessary, however, to draw conclusions more confidently.
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here]
Statistical Models
To estimate the difference in contribution margin between acquisition modes (H1a) we use a regression model with the following specification: The size of our sample implies that we need not assume the random shocks to be normally distributed for statistical inference using t and F statistics (e.g., Wooldridge 2002, pp. 167-171) .
To test whether the difference in margin decreases the longer the customer has been with the bank (H1b), we use a fixed-effects specification estimated using OLS:
where i indexes the customer, t indexes the year (t = 1, 2, 3), DCM it is the Daily Contribution
Margin of customer i in year t, i.e., the total contribution margin generated by customer i in year t divided by the number of days that the customer was with the firm during year t, T it is the cumulative number of days the customer i had been with the bank by the end of year t, η t is a year-specific fixed effect, and the customer-specific intercepts α i are not constrained to follow any specific distribution but capture all individual-specific, time-invariant differences, including the effect of acquisition through the referral program (RP) and that of the control variables X.
The errors ε it have a mean of zero and are independent of the covariates. The β 3 coefficient captures the proper interaction effect because the β 1 effect of RP is now captured through the fixed effects. As before, we use the robust Huber-White standard errors (Breusch-Pagan test, p < .001). 
RESULTS
Is the Contribution Margin of Referred Customers Higher?
In accordance with H1a, referred customers are on average 4.5 cents per day more profitable than other customers (Mann-Whitney test, p < .001). The difference is even larger after we control for differences in customer demographics and time of acquisition, variables on which the two groups of customers are not perfectly matched. The first column of Table 2 reports the coefficients of Equation 4, controlling for Age, Sex, Marital Status, and Month of Acquisition. Whereas the average contribution margin of non-referred customers in our sample is 30 cents/day, customers acquired through the referral program have a margin that is 7.6 cents/day or 27.74 Euros/year higher (p < .001), an increase of about 25%. Among the covariates, higher age and being widowed are associated with a higher contribution margin, whereas being married is associated with a lower contribution margin. The pattern in the monthly coefficients suggests that the bank was more successful in acquiring profitable customers in some months than in others. The R 2 is quite low, indicating that other important elements besides acquisition method, acquisition time, and demographics drive customer profitability. Even though the large unexplained variance depresses the power of statistical tests and hence makes it harder to reject the null hypothesis, H1a is strongly supported.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
5 In-sample parameter estimates from the Cox and Weibull models are nearly identical. The reason for using the Cox model in testing the hypotheses is the absence of a restrictive parametric assumption on the duration dependence.
Does the Contribution Margin of Referred Customers Remain Higher?
H1b predicts that the difference in contribution margin erodes, the longer a customer stays with the bank. Our results support this expectation. Column 2 of Table 2 
Is the Retention of Referred Customers Higher?
To test if the retention rate is higher for referred than for non-referred customers (H2a) to a baseline hazard that is very small. As indicated by the survival curves in Figure 2 , the probability of being an active customer (i.e., a non-churning customer) after 33 months is 82.0%
for referred customers and 79.2% for non-referred customers. Age is associated with a higher churn rate, whereas the opposite holds for being widowed. There is also a trend in the monthly coefficients, indicating that customers acquired late in 2006 (especially in September and later) exhibit more churn than those acquired earlier. This trend is a cohort effect and not duration dependence which is captured in the non-parametric baseline hazard.
Does the Retention of Referred Customers Remain Higher?
We also assess whether the difference in retention varies over the customers' lifetime (H2b). To do so, we extend the Cox model with an interaction between the Referral Program variable and the natural logarithm of the customer's duration with the bank (see column 4 of Table 2 ). The interaction is not significant and the model fit does not improve significantly (p > .05). So, while there is an eroding difference between referred and non-referred customers in contribution margin, there is no such erosion for customer retention. more valuable to the bank than a comparable non-referred customer over a horizon of six years.
Taking into account the difference in acquisition costs of around 20 Euros, the difference in Customer Lifetime Value is nearly 25%. This value differential is quite considerable.
We also assess to what extent the differences in customer value are robust across various subsets of customers. Table 3 reports the regression coefficients for the Referral Program in models of customer value, with the same controls as in the previous analysis in columns 5 and 6
of Table 2 . Row 1 of Table 3 shows that the results for the retail customer segment are nearly identical to those for the entire sample. This is not surprising, as retail customers make up almost 90% of our overall sample. More informative is that the difference in customer value also exists in the non-retail segment (row 2 of Table 3 ).
Rows 3 and 4 of Table 3 show that the positive referral differential exists among highmargin customers, defined as those in the top decile based on margin, but not low-margin customers, defined as those in the bottom decile based on margin. 8 The remaining rows in Table 3 show that sizable value differentials between referred and non-referred customers exist both among men and women, and among all age ranges except those more than 55 years old.
Overall, the acquisition through a referral program is associated with higher customer value for the great majority of customer types, but not all. These results suggest that using referral programs might not be beneficial in all customer segments, an idea we develop further in the Discussion section.
[Insert Table 3 about here ] Table 4 shows that the hypothesis tests are robust to including retail versus non-retail segment membership as an additional control variable, and allowing the effect of the referral program to vary as a function of age, sex, marital status and retail segment membership. Given the results of Table 3 , we also allowed for a non-linear effect of age. 9 We mean-center all variables interacting with Referral Program, so its coefficient still reflects the main effect. This coefficient keeps its sign and significance in each model, so the hypotheses remain supported.
Robustness Checks
The coefficients are larger than in Table 2 in which we did not control for segment membership and non-linear age effects, indicating that our main analysis provides rather conservative estimates of the referral effects.
[Insert Table 4 about here ]
As a second robustness check, we repeated the analyses presented in Table 2 for the sample including all outliers. The direction and significance of the referral effect remained the same, but the size of several effects increased. The difference in Daily Contribution Margin increased from 7.6 to 16 cents/day, the margin erosion increased from 23.1 to 45.4 cents per thousand days, the churn hazard reduction remained at 20%, and the difference in Customer
Lifetime Value increased from 40 to 66 Euros. These results suggest that our main analysis is rather conservative with regard to the size of the referral differentials.
Though hazard analysis properly accounts for right-censoring, managers are also interested in simply knowing who is likely to have remained with the firm within a certain time frame. We therefore also assessed the relation between referral and the probability of still being with the bank 21 months after acquisition. This time span is the longest duration that is observable without right-censoring for each and every customer, including those who were acquired last, at the end of December 2006. Using logistic regression and controlling for demographics and month of acquisition, we find that referred customers are about 22% less likely to leave the firm within the first 21 months (p < .01).
Computing the Customer Lifetime Value over three, rather than six, years after acquisition, and repeating the analysis controlling for demographics and time of acquisition, yields a value differential between referred and non-referred customers of 52 Euros (p < .001), rather than of 40
Euros. Both the size and the statistical significance of the latter value is rather robust to reestimating the model on smaller random samples of 90% (39€, p < 0.001), 75% (42€, p < 0.001), 50% (48€, p < 0.001), and 25% (36€, p < 0.01). We also computed the expected value differential if there were no difference in retention between referred and non-referred customers.
The differential in six-year Customer Lifetime Value would have decreased from 40 to 33 Euros.
Finally, we extended the model of margin dynamics and allowed the effect of time and its interaction with referral to vary as a function of observed customer demographics, retail versus non-retail status, and normally distributed unobserved heterogeneity. This extended random coefficients model did not fit the data better: the squared correlation between observed and predicted values (pseudo-R 2 ) increased by only 0.1%, and the BIC even decreased. Most importantly, the coefficients of central interest and the statistical inference were not affected:
Customers acquired through referral had a sizable initial margin advantage that eroded to zero after about 1,000 days.
DISCUSSION
Key Findings
Evidence of the economic value of stimulated WOM and of the customers it helps acquire has been sorely lacking. Our study addresses this gap in the context of referral programs and documents the attractiveness of customers acquired through such a program: Contribution margin, retention, and customer value all were significantly and sizably higher for referred customers. In short, referred customers are more valuable in both the short and long run. Yet, we also find that the effect is not uniform across all types of customers, and that the referral program was less beneficial when used to acquire older customers or low-margin customers.
In our application, the value of referred customers in the six years after acquisition was 40 Euros, or 16%, higher than that of non-referred customers with similar demographics and -25-time of acquisition. Considering the initial reward of 25 Euros given to the referrer as an investment, this implies a Return on Investment of roughly 60% over a six-year span. This is a conservative estimate because it does not take into account that the total acquisition costs of referred customers are around 20 Euros lower than those of other customers.
Implications for Practice
Several scholars have expressed cautious skepticism about the value of viral-for-hire and Our results, however, also suggest that firms should think carefully about what prospects to target with referral programs and how big of a referral fee to provide. For the program we analyzed, we found that the customer value differential is much larger in some segments than in others. People less than 55 years old and high-margin customers are more attractive to acquire through a referral program. It need not be a coincidence that these also tend to be the more profitable customers for banks (and many other consumer marketers). To the extent that the value differential stems from better matching and social enrichment, as suggested by sociological theory and documented in employee referral programs, referral programs do not "create" higher value customers by transforming unattractive prospects into attractive customers. Rather, they help firms to selectively acquire more valuable prospects and to retain them longer at lower cost.
Hence, instead of the currently practiced "all in" approach, firms should design and target referral programs such that attractive customers are more likely to be pulled in.
Managers must also make their customers aware of their referral programs. Bank of America, for example, communicates its referral program at all its ATMs throughout the United States.
Connecting referral programs with online activities might help to further increase their reach beyond existing customers' networks of strong ties and face-to-face interactions. Managers must also make it convenient for prospects to actually become a customer. One possible application is to partner with online communities and make it easy for people to start a relationship with the firm online, immediately after they receive a referral from an existing customer in the same community. Our results suggest that such awareness and facilitation efforts should be targeted selectively towards those customers offering the highest value differential.
The referral fee is another issue that requires attention when designing a referral program.
Many programs offer the same reward to each referrer (Kumar, Petersen, and Leone 2010 ). Yet, as we showed, the value of referred customers can vary widely even for one company. Hence, firms may benefit from offering rewards based on the value of the referred customer. However, the question then becomes how to do this without adding too much complexity to the program.
There may be a simple answer: A standard homophily argument suggests that valuable referrers are more likely to generate valuable referrals. Hence, firms may want to make the referral fee a function of the value of the referrer.
A very different approach to take advantage of the referral effect would be to try to generate conditions where non-referred customers become subject to the same mechanisms that make referred customers more valuable. To the extent that the differences we have documented stem from better matching, from social enrichment, or from other mechanisms that firms can actively foster among all customers, they may be able to dramatically "scale up" the beneficial referral effect beyond dyads of referring and referred customers. For instance, pharmaceutical companies increasingly involve local opinion leaders in their speaker programs and other medical education efforts. They do so to capitalize on these physicians' relevance and credibility with practicing physicians.
Firms in the same industry often reward referrers with the same amount. For example, most
German banks offer 25 Euros for a referral. So did the one we studied. Our results indicate that managers set the referral fee rather low, allowing the firm to reap attractive returns from its program. Offering higher rewards might lead to even more customer acquisitions while still providing positive returns on investment. Firms should calculate the reward considering their specific program and the customers it attracts instead of merely following their competitors.
Future Research
Our study focuses on referred and non-referred customers of one particular bank. Whereas its customer base and referral program have no unusual characteristics, replications would obviously be very welcome. Such studies require rich, firm-specific data on a large set of customers, with individual profitability observed over a long period. Therefore, we expect replications and extensions to come from other single-firm studies like ours and those by Godes and Mayzlin (2009 ), Haenlein (2010 ), Iyengar, Van den Bulte and Valente (2010 ), and Nitzan and Libai (2010 . Because the mechanisms of better matching and social enrichment are likely to be more important for complex products with important experience attributes, rather than simple products with mostly search attributes (e.g., Coverdill 1998; Kornish and Li 2010; Rees 1966) , studies of multiple products with varying levels of complexity would be especially informative.
It is quite likely that the quality of the matches with the firm deteriorates as existing 
CONCLUSION
This study provides the first assessment of economically relevant differences between customers acquired through a referral program and customers acquired through other methods. It documents sizable differences in contribution margin, retention, and customer value; analyzes whether these differences erode or persist over time; and investigates differences across customer segments. The finding that referred customers are on average more valuable than other customers provides the first direct evidence of the financial attractiveness of referral programs and also provides much-needed evidence of the financial appeal of stimulated WOM in general.
Improvements in the targeting, design, and implementation of such programs will require a better understanding of the drivers of the value differential. The dyadic interdependence in the behavior of referrer and referred customer deserves special attention in future research, as it is likely to prove highly relevant to both better theoretical understanding and more effective program management. ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ N = 9,495. All correlations with absolute value of 0.02 or higher are significant at the 5% level. Note: Differences in observed Duration across customers are strongly affected by differences in the month of acquisition. As a result, the zero-order correlations of Duration with other variables also correlated with month of acquisition can be quite misleading. For instance, the correlation between Duration and Referral Program changes from -0.17 to 0.03 after controlling for month of acquisition. -11,715.6 -11,715.4 Robust standard errors in parentheses.
a captured by customer-specific fixed effects.
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Table 2 , but estimated for specific segments. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. -11,705.8 -11,705.6 Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include dummies for month of acquisition. a Age is divided by 100 for better readability; b Interaction effects are with the first variable mean-centered; c Since the model is a random coefficients model estimated with Residual Maximum Likelihood (REML), this value is a pseudo-R 2 calculated as the squared correlation between predicted and actual values. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Note: Customers were able to leave immediately after joining, but only a handful did so. The earliest defection took place after 64 days, and only 27 customers left within the first year of joining. 
